Dutch Commander Thinks Americans Too Quick on the Trigger

While he supports the sending of additional Dutch troops to Afghanistan, Dutch Commander, General Dick Berlijn, is nevertheless critical of the way American forces have acted, remarking that 'some countries' have taken 'unnecessarily harsh actions and as a result evoked unnecessary resistance.' He is also insistent that the commander of U.S. counter-insurgency operation, Operation Enduring Freedom, not have control of NATO forces helping rebuild and keep order in the country.

By Eric Vrijsen

Translated By Meta Martens

January 18, 2006

Original Article (Dutch)    

ELSEVIER: What happens if the [Dutch] military won't go [as part of an expanded NATO force into more dangerous areas of Afghanistan]?

Dick Berlijn: In that case, Uruzgan will be condemned to the status quo. American actions have had little or no effect so far. The Taliban has been dealt with - which was necessary - but the country has not become more stable. What is necessary now is the drilling of water wells, the organization of police forces and projects to employ people. The Dutch have shown elsewhere that they can take on that task. We know that you can't just race through the streets in tanks with closed turrets.  

ELSEVIER: Is the Dutch approach also safer for military personnel?

Berlijn: I am not making predictions about the number of casualties. I know that some countries in regions of conflict have taken unnecessarily harsh actions and as a result evoked unnecessary resistance. When Dutch troops are being challenged with violence, they will have the discipline to hold their own. We continue to respect the local culture. We won't all of the sudden say: "Lift the burqas and search." We have never searched women or children in Iraq.

ELSEVIER: Do the Americans with their Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have to stay away from Uruzgan in order for the Dutch to be successful with the NATO stability mission ISAF?

Berlijn: If it is necessary to hunt for terrorist in that area, the OEF commander has to consult with the NATO command. We can't have it that one day we engage in reconstruction and the next day the OEF bulldozers destroy everything again.

ELSEVIER: An American sub-commander maintains his influence on the NATO mission. Does a European commander need to exercise influence on OEF?

Berlijn: The presupposition of the operation is that the NATO command is in charge. He is the highest commander in that region. He can forbid OEF activities. There are still negotiations about lines of command, but it is clear that OEF cannot exist at the expense of ISAF [International Security Assistance Force].

ELSEVIER: It is critical that the Dutch don't dishonorably wipe out armed resistance, but instead offer a respectable way out. Is this too soft an approach for the Americans?

Berlijn: Our American friends are very well aware of what we can accomplish. Dutch solders exercise good judgments about a situation. We sometimes see things that are not right. But a little tolerance is not so bad. Sometimes you have to be a little flexible. You can encounter situations that have more than one answer. You shouldn't leave the starting blocks in armored tanks in every single incident. Then you become predictable. Then the opponent knows exactly how you will react and will provoke situations in which you will be vulnerable.

ELEVIER: Can the approach of good intentions also evoke resistance? Afghans will complain soon that, for example, that they still lack a sewage system.
Berlijn: We prefer to start with projects that bring fast results. That will inspire confidence among the Afghans about us. But of course they have to remain owners of their own problems. We are the auxiliary troops of the local government. And if that government is no good, it must go.

ELSEVIER: In order to convince Parliament, concessions will be necessary. Is it too much involved in the details of the operation?

Berlijn: I don't like it when members of Parliament are involved in all sorts of military considerations. Then you create a situation in which people in their armchair in The Hague read a column and suddenly want to send extra troops or weapons.