O Globo, Brazil

The USA Loses Credibility in the Effort Against Nuclear Proliferation

By William Waack

Translated By Andrew Della Rocca

December 6, 2007

Brazil - O Globo - Original Article (Portuguese)

The United States has a tradition of losing credibility in nuclear disputes, and the about-face in the cause of Iran isn’t close to being the most eloquent example.  One can say, without exaggeration, that some of the nuclear policies of the last three decades were motivated by a notable insecurity promulgated by American governments.

The insistence of Brazil, for example, in the 1970s, to seek a method of uranium enrichment was, in the first place, based on a fear of not having enough reactors - rather than an intention to obtain fissile material for bombs.  In that era, the mechanisms that privatized the production of nuclear power in the United States and permitted companies to stop doing business with Brazil were signed by President Richard Nixon on the same day that he resigned:   it is not surprising that the Brazilian military regime lost confidence in the Americans, and continued its business with the then West Germany.

Another excellent example of regional nuclear insecurity created in large part by the White House was the long process that brought about the signing of the nuclear accords between India and the United States last year.  India has the bomb, never respected the standards for non-proliferation stipulated by the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency of Vienna, an organ of the UN) - yet won an enviable treaty of cooperation, with access to technologies that Americans do not provide to others.

Iran itself is a great illustration of nuclear policies that rewards friends and punishes opponents.  Back to the 1970s, when the government in Tehran was that of the Shah Rehza Pahlevi – then one of the principal American allies in the Middle East – the White House saw nothing problematic with the Iranian monarch’s plans to build nuclear reactors (which was not the case when German competitors were taking the business).

This is the point that the Iranians, skillful negotiators that they are, have repeated since the first denunciations emerged indicating that the regime of the Ayatollahs is trying to build a bomb.  From the material published in the international press over the past four years, it is possible to say with reasonable certainty that Iran wanted (and likely still wants), yes, to have nuclear capability.

The root of the Iranian efforts was the Iran-Iraq war (one of the deadliest of the twentieth century).  The then newly installed regime of the ayatollahs (the war began in October of 1980 and lasted until mid-1998) was attacked by a dictator, Saddam Hussein, who tried to produce all types of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.    Saddam used chemical weapons against the Iranians, who initially only escaped defeat thanks to the terrible qualifications of Saddam as commander in chief.

Taking into account, still in the 1940s, the classic cases of the United States and the then Soviet Union, the majority of the countries that obtained the bomb had as their central focus worries of defense.  The argument is especially true in the case of Israel and Pakistan, who felt themselves surrounded and threatened by neighbors that appeared to be very powerful (such that the perception of the situation was the most important factor).

The recent report of the American intelligence community – “relaxing” the perceived nuclear danger represented by Iran – evidently binds the White House, makes it difficult for the Security Council to impose more rigid sanctions on Iran, and gives the ayatollahs enormous propaganda opportunities.  But there is still another, greater, lesson, to take from this episode.

It’s the lack of credibility of the great nuclear powers – the USA at the head – that makes it so difficult to imagine that a regime of non-proliferation will continue for much longer.  The current regime is based on a prohibition (of the spread of nuclear technologies) in exchange for a promise – that of nuclear disarmament.

That promise has never been fulfilled.   

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